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Failed Charity: Taking State Tax Benefits 




The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) substantially limited the 
ability of individuals to deduct state and local taxes (SALT) on 
their federal income tax returns. Some states are advancing 
schemes to allow taxpayers a state tax credit for contributions to a 
charity controlled by the state. The issue is whether state tax 
benefits are deductible as a charitable contribution for purposes of 
the federal income tax. Under a general rule of prior law—the full 
deduction rule—state tax benefits were ignored for purposes of the 
charitable deduction. If the full deduction rule is applied to the 
state workaround schemes, then the SALT limitation can 
successfully be avoided. This Article explains that after the TCJA, 
the legal basis for the full deduction rule is undermined. The IRS 
articulated the full deduction rule given the longstanding baseline 
of deductible state tax payments. Thus, to allow a charitable 
deduction for state tax benefits under prior law was simply to 
allow a deduction for an otherwise deductible expense. After the 
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TCJA, this symmetry with the SALT deduction is gone and the full 
deduction rule is of questionable applicability. A charitable 
deduction for state tax benefits would allow taxpayers to deduct 
amounts not spent and even to profit from charitable transfers. 
The charitable deduction is intended to encourage giving, not tax 
avoidance. Thus, the Treasury Department and the courts should 
apply a longstanding principle of charitable contribution law that 
measures a contribution by the amount of taxpayer sacrifice. After 
the TCJA, a contribution should be reduced by the value of state 
tax benefits, whether the benefits take the form of a credit or a 
deduction. The reasoning applies both to state workaround credits 
(and deductions) and to existing state tax benefits that previously 
have been deducted as charitable. Further, denying a charitable 
deduction for previously deductible expenses is in fact consistent 
with the status quo prior to the TCJA, in that, given the loss of a 
SALT deduction, the charitable deduction was an offset that did 
not provide a meaningful benefit to taxpayers. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)1 limited the federal 
income tax itemized deduction for state and local taxes 
(SALT or the “SALT deduction”) to $10,000 annually.2 As a 
result, taxpayers who formerly deducted state and local 
taxes in excess of $10,000 lose a significant tax benefit.3 In 
response, some state governments have enacted 
workarounds to preserve the federal deductibility of 
payments that inure to the benefit of the state and other 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The official title of the legislation is “An act to 
provide for reconciliation pursuant to Titles II and V of the concurrent 
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” 
 2. Id. § 11042 at 2085–86. For married taxpayers filing separately, the 
limit is $5,000. The limitation expires for taxable years beginning on or after 
January 1, 2026. 
 3. If such taxpayers continue to itemize, the amount no longer deductible is 
the amount of taxes paid less $10,000. If such taxpayers take the standard 
deduction ($24,000 for a couple filing jointly and $12,000 for singles), then the 
amount no longer deductible depends on various factors. For example, if a 
couple filing jointly took the standard deduction of $24,000 and had no other 
potentially deductible expenses (e.g., mortgage interest, charitable 
contributions), then the amount no longer deductible to them would be the 
amount of taxes paid less $24,000. 
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states are considering similar legislation.4 
The general approach is for a state to provide a tax 
credit for payments to a charity5 that is controlled by the 
state.6 If the payment qualifies as a charitable 
contribution,7 then the payment is deductible for federal 
income tax purposes. The workarounds thus contemplate 
the recharacterization of nondeductible state tax payments 
as deductible charitable contributions. The Treasury 
Department has announced its intention to issue proposed 
regulations on the tax treatment of these types of 
arrangements.8 
The issue raised by the workarounds is whether a 
taxpayer’s receipt of state tax benefits in connection with a 
payment to charity affects the allowance of a charitable 
deduction. If state tax benefits are ignored for charitable 
contribution purposes, then the workarounds will succeed 
in avoiding the SALT limitation. If, on the other hand, state 
 
 4. Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Oregon have 
enacted workaround credit schemes. See, e.g., Ryan Hutchins, New Jersey 
Legislature Passes SALT Workaround, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2018, 7:23 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2018/04/12/new-jersey-
legislature-passes-salt-workaround-362279; Gerald B. Silverman, New York 
Legislature Enacts Major Tax Overhaul, BNA (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bna.com/new-york-legislature-n57982090688/. 
 5. “Charity” in this Article is shorthand for an organization eligible to 
receive deductible contributions. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012). Charities include most 
organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and need 
not be charitable but may be organized for a variety of purposes, including 
charitable, educational, scientific, religious, and literary. Id. § 501(c)(3). 
Charities for this purpose also include government entities. Id. § 170(c)(1). 
 6. New York takes a variety of approaches. Taxpayers may receive an 85% 
credit on state income taxes for contributions to a state fund with separate 
accounts for health and education, or for donations to a private nonprofit that 
supports the State University of New York or the City University of New York. 
See S.B. S7509-C, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 7. I.R.C. § 170(c). 
 8. I.R.S. Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 I.R.B., https://www.irs.gov/irb/2018-
24_IRB (describing the workaround credits as an effort by states to “circumvent 
the new statutory limitation on state and local tax deductions”). 
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tax benefits are relevant for purposes of determining a 
charitable contribution, then the workarounds will provide 
a reduced or no federal tax benefit. 
Importantly, the issue is not limited to the state 
workaround credits, but bears directly on a wide array of 
other state tax credit programs that link state tax benefits 
to payments to a charity. Some states for example offer a 
100% credit for payments to independent charitable 
organizations (i.e., charities not controlled by the state).9 To 
the extent state tax benefits are not deductible charity as 
part of a SALT workaround, the same reasoning for 
nondeductibility applies to these other types of payments. 
Thus, how the Treasury Department (and ultimately the 
courts) resolve this issue has implications not just for the 
federal tax treatment of the workaround schemes but for 
many existing state credits and deductions. 
In weighing the issues, it is important to consider how 
state tax benefits historically have been treated for 
charitable deduction purposes. In general, prior to the 
TCJA, a full federal charitable deduction was allowed 
notwithstanding the receipt of state tax benefits for the 
contribution,10 i.e., state tax benefits were ignored for 
charitable deduction purposes. This position was recently 
coined as the “full deduction rule” in an article by several 
law professors.11 The question is whether the full deduction 
 
 9. Many of these credits are listed in the appendix to Joseph Bankman, et 
al., State Response to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax Credits, 159 TAX 
NOTES 641 (2018) [hereinafter FDR Paper]. 
 10. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 201105010 (Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 
2011 CCA]. 
 11. FDR Paper, supra note 9; see also Kirk J. Stark, Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Contributions & State Tax Credits, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS 
1 (2018). For convenience, this Article adopts the term “full deduction rule” 
though its status as a widely known or understood rule is debatable. As the 
authors of the FDR Paper note, as of 2011 “there was no judicial authority 
directly addressing the full deduction rule.” FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 646. 
For additional commentary, see David Gamage, Charitable Contributions in 
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rule survives the TCJA. If so, then a charitable deduction of 
the entire amount paid to charity may be available 
notwithstanding the receipt of substantial tax benefits.12 
This Article argues that a collateral effect of the TCJA 
is to change the full deduction rule. As the Article explains, 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) articulated the full 
deduction rule in reliance on the longstanding legal 
baseline of federally deductible state tax payments.13 Before 
the TCJA, any reduction in state tax liability (because of a 
state deduction or credit) meant a corresponding reduction 
to a taxpayer’s SALT deduction. Thus, when a transfer 
resulted in a state tax benefit under prior law, a federal 
charitable deduction for the value of the state tax benefit 
was offset by a lower SALT deduction.14 This pre TCJA 
 
Lieu of SALT Deductions, 87 ST. TAX NOTES 973 (2018); JARED WALCZAK, TAX 
FOUND., STATE STRATEGIES TO PRESERVE SALT DEDUCTIONS FOR HIGH-INCOME 
TAXPAYERS: WILL THEY WORK? 4 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/ 
20180105094213/Tax-Foundation-FF569.pdf; Amandeep S. Grewal, The 
Charitable Contribution Strategy: An Ineffective SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX. 
REV (Forthcoming  2018) [hereinafter Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute]; Eric 
Bennett Rasmussen, Getting Around the State and Local Tax Deduction Limit 
(Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099296); Andy Grewal, 
Can States Game the Republican Tax Bill with the Charitable Contribution 
Strategy?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 3, 2018), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/can-states-game-the-republican-tax-bill-with-the-
charitable-contribution-strategy/. 
 12. The authors of the FDR Paper believe that the deductibility of payments 
pursuant to state workaround schemes generally should withstand 
administrative and judicial challenge, except perhaps in the case of a 100 
percent state credit. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 642. There are other possible 
ways to attack the state workaround credits. Professor Grewal for example 
argues that the Treasury Department should use a substance over form 
approach. Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing 
different approaches and concluding that “nominal donations to state-controlled 
funds should be treated as the payment of state taxes”). 
 13. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 14. See discussion infra Section II.A. For alternative minimum tax 
taxpayers, however, the charitable deduction represented a gain, not an offset 
to the loss of a SALT deduction. This is because the SALT deduction is not 
available for alternative minimum tax (AMT) taxpayers while the charitable 
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symmetry appears to be a main reason the IRS decided that 
state tax benefits could be deducted as charitable 
contributions. After the TCJA, however, this symmetry is 
gone. Accordingly, the ongoing validity of the full deduction 
rule is doubtful and has little to no bearing on how state tax 
benefits should be treated after the TCJA. 
The TCJA’s mooting of the full deduction rule means 
that the treatment of tax benefits for charitable 
contribution purposes is an open question. In deciding the 
issue, the Treasury Department and the courts should 
follow a longstanding principle of charitable contribution 
law, namely that a contribution is measured by the extent 
to which a taxpayer has given something away. When a 
taxpayer receives state tax benefits for a contribution, the 
cost to the taxpayer, i.e., the taxpayer’s sacrifice, is reduced. 
Thus, a contribution for tax purposes should not include the 
value of tax benefits received. The full deduction rule is not 
a barrier to this result. 
Indeed, after the TCJA, to ignore tax benefits as return 
benefits would convert the charitable contributions 
deduction from an incentive to give into an incentive to 
profit. This could occur because the state workaround 
credits and many other state tax credits potentially become 
economic windfalls that would make taxpayers better off. 
For example, under a 100% state tax credit program, if a 
taxpayer transfers $100 to charity the taxpayer could 
receive $137 as a direct result. Any reasonable construction 
of the meaning of a “contribution” for purposes of the 
charitable deduction does not include such windfalls. In the 
words of the Supreme Court, if a transfer improves a 
taxpayer’s economic position, the transfer is not 
“unrequited” because the “external features” of the 
 
deduction is available. See SASHA PUDELSKI & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & 
ECON. POL’Y, PUBLIC LOSS PRIVATE GAIN: HOW SCHOOL VOUCHER TAX SHELTERS 
UNDERMINE PUBLIC EDUCATION4 (2017), https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
AASA_Public_Loss_Private_Gain_F2.pdf. 
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transaction show a net benefit to the taxpayer.15 The full 
deduction rule should not and need not be applied beyond 
its pre-TCJA context to allow the deduction of profit.16 
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the 
meaning of a “contribution” for purposes of the charitable 
deduction. The general principle, as reflected in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, is that a contribution reflects a notion 
of sacrifice, i.e., a contribution is the amount a taxpayer 
gives away. Part II discusses the full deduction rule and 
shows that the TCJA casts serious doubt on its ongoing 
validity both as a matter of law and in light of congressional 
intent. Part II also explains that the Treasury Department 
and the courts should characterize state tax benefits as 
return benefits that reduce the amount of, or eliminate, the 
charitable deduction. Doing so sensibly reflects the 
longstanding definition of a contribution as the amount 
sacrificed by the taxpayer. To do otherwise, would convert 
the charitable deduction into an instrument of profit, not an 
incentive to give. Part III extends the analysis to state tax 
benefits other than the workaround credits and briefly 
considers administrative concerns. The Article then 
concludes that state tax benefits should be treated as 
return benefits for purposes of the charitable deduction. 
I. THE MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION AS SACRIFICE 
The federal charitable contributions deduction is an 
incentive to give. From the initial legislative history17 
 
 15. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989). 
 16. The full deduction rule does not appear to have been applied in cases in 
which a taxpayer profits from a contribution. The examples explored by the 
FDR Paper authors involve cases where the taxpayer is not better off from the 
contribution, even after taking tax benefits into account. See FDR Paper, supra 
note 9. 
 17. Speaking on the Senate floor in support of a charitable deduction in 
1917, Senator Hollis pronounced: 
After they have done everything else they want to do, after they have 
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through court decisions, the deduction is described in terms 
of encouraging taxpayers to make a sacrifice.18 
As explained below, how to account for benefits that 
flow to a taxpayer from a transfer is fundamental to the 
meaning of a contribution. In general, if a taxpayer is better 
off because of a transfer (i.e., the benefits from a payment 
exceed the payment), then there is no contribution. When a 
taxpayer profits, then almost by definition, an incentive is 
not necessary, there is no contribution, and a deduction 
should not be allowed. If a taxpayer is not better off from 
the transfer, and there is intent to make a gift, then the 
general rule is to measure the contribution by the amount 
of the transfer less the value of any return benefits 
received.19 In such a case, the deductible contribution is the 
amount of the taxpayer’s sacrifice. 
These general rules come from the language of the 
Internal Revenue Code and court decisions. Technically 
speaking, the Code allows a deduction for a “charitable 
contribution.”20 In defining the term, Congress provided 
only that a charitable contribution is a “contribution or gift 
to or for the use of” an eligible organization21 and did not 
define either contribution or gift.22 Accordingly, over the 
years, the courts have wrestled with the meaning of the 
 
educated their children and traveled and spent their money on 
everything they really want or think they want, then, if they have 
something left over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red 
Cross or for some scientific purposes. Now, when war comes and we 
impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place 
where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in 
donations to charity. They will say, “Charity begins at home.” 
55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917). 
 18. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690 (summarizing the legislative history of 
the deduction as being for “unrequited payments”). 
 19. Treas. Reg. § 170A-1(h)(2)(i) (2008); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. 
 20. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2012). 
 21. Id. § 170(c). 
 22. Id. 
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terms. One constant is that the taxpayer must have 
donative intent, with a main legal issue being whether 
intent is assessed by a subjective or an objective approach. 
Early decisions required that a charitable contribution 
be made with detached and disinterested generosity.23 This 
standard was borrowed from a Supreme Court case, 
Commissioner v. Duberstein,24 which construed the 
meaning of a gift for purposes of the income tax exclusion.25 
As a general matter, however, the Duberstein standard fell 
out of favor because it relies on determining the subjective 
intent of the taxpayer, making the test hard to administer. 
A leading early case to reject the Duberstein approach 
for charitable contributions was Singer Co. v. United 
States,26 in which the Claims Court used a return benefit 
test. Under a return benefit test, instead of examining the 
taxpayer’s motives, the criterion is whether a taxpayer 
expects to receive return benefits. If so, then the 
transaction is more like an exchange for value received and 
not a contribution. An advantage to a return benefit test is 
that whether there is a return benefit can be determined 
objectively by looking at the external features of the 
transaction. 
Eventually, the Supreme Court embraced the Singer 
court’s approach with two decisions in the 1980s, United 
States v. American Bar Endowment27 and Hernandez v. 
 
 23. DeJong v. Comm’r, 309 F.2d 373, 377–79 (9th Cir. 1962) (noting that 
“contribution” and “gift” are synonymous and therefore it was appropriate to 
apply the standard in Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) on excludable 
gifts to deductible contributions). 
 24. 363 U.S. at 287–91. 
 25. I.R.C. § 102. 
 26. 449 F.2d 413, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (adopting a quid pro quo test for a 
contribution and rejecting the Duberstein test because “it would then be 
necessary for us to look to the subjective intent of the plaintiff . . . . This would 
not be an impossible task, but it would indeed be a very difficult one.”). 
 27. 477 U.S. 105 (1986). 
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Commissioner.28 In American Bar Endowment, the issue 
was whether the taxpayers intentionally overpaid a charity 
for insurance and so were able to deduct the overpayment.29 
The Court held against the taxpayers, setting forth a 
substantial return benefit standard for a charitable 
contribution. The Court said that: “[a] payment of money 
generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the 
contributor expects a substantial benefit in return.”30 Here, 
the taxpayers expected to receive insurance in exchange for 
the payment to charity—a substantial benefit. Thus, as a 
threshold matter, there was no contribution. 
The Court acknowledged, however, that payments could 
take on a dual character as part gift and part exchange, 
leaving the door open to deduct an overpayment as a 
contribution. The Court provided that 
a taxpayer may sometimes receive only a nominal benefit in 
return for his contribution. Where the size of the payment [to 
charity] is clearly out of proportion to the benefit received [by the 
donor], it would not serve the purposes of § 170 to deny a 
deduction altogether. A taxpayer may therefore claim a deduction 
for the difference between a payment to a charitable organization 
and the market value of the benefit received in return, on the 
theory that the payment has the “dual character” of a purchase 
and a contribution.31 
Under the Court’s approach, in order for part of a dual 
payment to be deductible, there are two conditions: the 
payment must exceed the market value of the benefit 
received and the payment “must be ‘made with the 
intention of making a gift.’”32 The Court also said: “[t]he 
 
 28. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 29. 477 U.S. at 108–09. 
 30. Id. at 116. 
 31. Id. at 117. 
 32. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104). This standard was later 
promulgated in regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1) (2008) (providing that 
no part of a payment made in consideration for goods or services is a 
contribution unless the taxpayer “[i]ntends to make a payment in an amount 
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taxpayer . . . must at a minimum demonstrate that he 
purposely contributed money or property in excess of the 
value of any benefit he received in return.”33 
Two features of the Court’s approach are worth noting. 
One is affirmance of the basic idea that a contribution 
requires a sacrifice by the taxpayer. The taxpayer must 
show “at a minimum” that the amount transferred exceeds 
the value of any return benefit. If there is a substantial 
return benefit, then there is no sacrifice and no 
contribution.34 Another is that donative intent is required, 
hence the Court’s references to the taxpayer’s expectations 
and purpose. However, the test for intent is not a subjective 
inquiry into the taxpayer’s motives but rather is based on 
objective factors—the presence of return benefits.35 The 
Court did not limit the types of benefits that could be 
considered return benefits.36 
Three years later, the Court solidified the substantial 
 
that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services” and “[m]akes a 
payment in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or 
services”). 
 33. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118. As applied, the Court found that 
the taxpayers failed to meet their burden as none showed awareness that 
similar but cheaper insurance was available elsewhere. Notably, a charitable 
deduction is not automatic if the amount transferred exceeds the value of 
benefits received. The taxpayer must be able to demonstrate that the 
overpayment was intentional. 
 34. Id. at 116. 
 35. Donative intent is not always easy to reduce to an objective 
determination. For instance, if a business negotiates a sale to charity where the 
charity pays less than fair market value, the business is not entitled to deduct 
the difference absent donative intent to make a contribution, even though the 
taxpayer did not receive full value. See Connell v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1657, 1662 (1986) (holding that the sale of land for less than the appraised 
value did not yield a charitable contribution because there was no evidence of 
donative intent to make a gift), aff’d per curiam, 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988); 
Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 256 (1986) (“The taxpayer who negotiates for the 
best terms he can obtain in a commercial transaction cannot subsequently claim 
a deduction based upon any excess value of the ‘contributed’ property over the 
consideration received . . . .”). 
 36. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117. 
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return benefit approach in Hernandez v. Commissioner.37 In 
Hernandez, the Court again rejected subjective motive as 
the test for the meaning of contribution, noting that the IRS 
looks to the “external features” of the transfer. External 
features, the Court said, have the advantage of obviating 
“the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the 
motivations of individual taxpayers.”38 The Court also cited 
1954 legislative history in which Congress defined gifts as 
payments “made with no expectation of a financial return 
commensurate with the amount of the gift.”39 Thus, under 
both Hernandez and American Bar Endowment, the Court 
looked to the external features of a transfer for return 
benefits, which serve as a proxy for donative intent. 
Hernandez and American Bar Endowment are known 
today for the rejection of the Duberstein approach and the 
embrace of an external features or quid pro quo analysis for 
charitable contributions. The black letter law to emerge 
from the decisions is: (1) the taxpayer may not receive more 
than the taxpayer pays, (2) dual character transfers are 
allowed, and (3) in the case of dual character transfers, the 
amount of the contribution is the amount of the payment 
less the value of benefits received.40 
 
 37. 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 690–91 (noting that the Court also looked to “external features” in 
American Bar Endowment). 
 39. Id. at 690 (citing S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 196 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 83-
1337, at A44 (1954)). The Court also said: “The legislative history of the 
‘contribution or gift’ limitation . . . reveals that Congress intended to 
differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and 
payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services.” Id. The Court 
went on to say unrequited payments are deductible while payments made with 
an expectation of quid pro quo in terms of goods or services are not. Id. 
 40. Assuming there is a contribution, other rules may apply to limit the 
amount of the deduction, including caps based on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income, whether the gift is property and if so what type, and the type of donee 
(a public charity or private foundation). For an overview of applicable rules, see, 
for example, Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions 
Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331 (2015). 
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The Court, however, did not address all questions. One 
issue is which benefits count as “external features” of a 
transaction that reduce or eliminate the deduction. In both 
American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, the context is a 
quid pro quo exchange, meaning that the benefits flow from 
the recipient charity not a third party.41 Thus, the Court 
declares in American Bar Endowment the oft-cited 
statement that: “[t]he sine qua non of a charitable 
contribution is a transfer of money or property without 
adequate consideration.”42 Similarly, in Hernandez, the 
Court refers to the contractual concept of consideration as 
important to determining whether a benefit is a relevant 
external feature of the transaction.43 The Treasury 
Regulations subsequently echoed the consideration 
approach to return benefits, setting forth a legal standard 
for the deduction when a transaction includes payments 
that are “in consideration for . . . goods or services.”44 These 
authorities therefore offer guidance for the typical case of 
return benefits received from the charity as part of an 
 
 41. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685–86; Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 
107–08. 
 42. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118. 
 43. 490 U.S. at 690 (citing Committee report examples of a payment to a 
hospital as being made “in consideration of a binding obligation to provide 
medical treatment”). The issue in Hernandez was whether the return benefit 
had to be of an economic nature, or whether return benefits of a religious or 
spiritual nature were relevant external features of the transaction. Id. at 687. 
The Court found that the religious benefits received “were part of a 
quintessential quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners 
received an identifiable benefit.” Id. at 691. Importantly, the Hernandez Court 
held that the return benefit did not have to be a financial benefit but could be 
intangible in nature, thus expanding the scope of relevant benefits beyond the 
ordinary case. See id. 692–93. 
 44. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h) (2008) (setting forth the standard for 
“[p]ayment in exchange for consideration”). The regulations provide that “Goods 
or services means cash, property, services, benefits, and privileges,” id. 
§ 1.170A-13(f)(5), and that goods or services of “insubstantial value” are 
disregarded. Id. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A). 
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exchange.45 
Importantly though, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Treasury regulations limit relevant benefits to those 
received as consideration. Notwithstanding the specific 
context of American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, case 
law provides that the relevant benefits do not have to come 
directly from the charity but rather flow from the transfer. 
In other words, both direct and indirect benefits are 
included when determining the external features of a 
transaction.46 
For example, in Singer, cited approvingly in American 
Bar Endowment, a sewing machine company sold sewing 
machines to a charity at a discount.47 The question was 
whether the company could deduct the discount as a 
charitable contribution, i.e., whether this was a dual 
character payment qualifying for part gift-part sale 
treatment.48 The court disallowed the deduction holding 
 
 45. Relatedly, the substantiation requirements for charitable contributions 
are directed to quid pro quo exchanges. Donors must substantiate contributions 
of $250 or more with a contemporaneous acknowledgement from the donee 
charity. The acknowledgement must indicate whether the donee “provided any 
goods or services in consideration” for the contribution and if so “[a] description 
and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services.” I.R.C. 
§§ 170(f)(8)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012). Charities are required to inform donors of the 
amount allowed as a deduction for quid pro quo contributions of more than $75. 
A quid pro quo contribution for this purpose is defined as “a payment made 
partly as a contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services 
provided to the payor by the donee organization.” Id. § 6115(b). 
 46. See Joseph Bankman, et al., Caveat IRS: Problems with Abandoning the 
Full Deduction Rule, 88 ST. TAX NOTES 547, 548–49 (2018) (noting that the 
“quid pro quo rule is not limited to situations in which the donor receives goods 
or services directly from the donee organization. A donor’s receipt of indirect 
benefits, whether from a specific third party or otherwise, has the same effect 
on the amount deductible under section 170,” “the law makes no distinction 
between direct and indirect benefits,” and “that the source of the benefit 
received by the donor is relevant”) [hereinafter Caveat IRS]. 
 47. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422–23 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (looking 
to the substantiality of all the benefits the taxpayer received). 
 48. Id. at 414, 422–23. 
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that Singer received a substantial indirect benefit from the 
sale of the sewing machines in the form of future purchases 
from the beneficiaries using the machines, i.e., something 
akin to good will.49 The benefit was not provided by the 
charity as part of the exchange, yet nonetheless, the return 
benefit was a relevant external feature that colored the 
transfer, with the result that there was no contribution.50 
Similarly, in Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, the 
taxpayer donated land to a school.51 The taxpayer expected 
that the ownership of the land by the school would increase 
the value of the taxpayer’s property holdings.52 The court 
disallowed a charitable deduction for the land because the 
transaction as a whole provided a net benefit to the 
taxpayer, notwithstanding the benefit to the charity.53 In 
the language of American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, 
the “external features”54 of the transaction showed that the 
taxpayer “expected a substantial benefit in return.”55 It did 
not matter that the benefit was not consideration for the 
payment to charity or that the charity did not provide the 
benefit.56 
In addition to not limiting the source of return benefits, 
the Supreme Court’s approach to the meaning of 
contribution left open the question of what makes a return 
benefit “substantial” so as to disallow a contribution 
entirely. The dichotomy established in American Bar 
Endowment is between substantial and nominal benefits, 
with no deduction for the former, and dual character 
 
 49. Id. at 424. 
 50. Id. at 423–24. 
 51. 699 F.2d 1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 52. Id. at 1135. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 691 (1989). 
 55. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986). 
 56. Ottawa Silica Co., 699 F.2d at 1135. 
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treatment for the latter.57 The language of American Bar 
Endowment therefore suggests that if a benefit is less than 
the amount of the payment, but not nominal, no deduction 
is allowed even though the taxpayer has given something 
away.58 In practice, however, the IRS has been inclined to 
allow a deduction so long as there is significant sacrifice.59 
Notably, absent further direction from the Supreme Court, 
determining the substantiality of a return benefit has been 
within the IRS’s discretion.60 
In summary, under prevailing authorities, the test for a 
contribution is one of substantial return benefit. Donative 
intent is required but is based upon the external features of 
the transaction not on a subjective inquiry into the 
taxpayer’s motives. As a general matter, if a taxpayer is 
better off because of the transfer, then the external features 
of the transaction suggest that there is no donative intent, 
and no charitable deduction is allowed even if a charity 
benefits. Although most of the authorities relate to quid pro 
quo exchanges where return benefits are provided by the 
 
 57. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 116–17. 
 58. Under the “nominal” benefit test, in theory if a benefit is 99% of the 
payment (e.g., a taxpayer pays $100 to charity and receives $99 in return), a 
deduction of $1 should not be allowed. 
 59. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, example 2 (allowing a deduction 
where return benefit was one-third of the amount paid). The intentionality of an 
overpayment generally can be shown by the required substantiation whereby 
the donee charity informs the donor that goods and services were provided in 
connection with the gift and provides a good faith estimate of the value of the 
goods and services. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B) (2012). Through this paperwork, the 
intentionality of an overpayment is established objectively. 
 60. See Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471 (providing that “charities offering 
certain small items or other benefits of token value may treat the benefits as 
having insubstantial value so that they may advise contributors that 
contributions are fully deductible under section 170”); William A. Drennan, 
Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 45, 56 (2011) (noting that “the Treasury Department and the IRS have 
adopted a series of authorities effectively valuing naming rights at zero, which 
allows naming donors to deduct their total transfers to charity” 
notwithstanding the receipt of something of contractual value). 
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charity, indirect benefits also count as external features of a 
transaction. The courts have not provided a bright line to 
determine when a return benefit that is less than the 
amount paid is substantial. 
II. STATE TAX BENEFITS AS RETURN BENEFITS 
The question presented in the aftermath of the TCJA is 
whether to take tax benefits into account as relevant 
external features of a transfer in determining the amount, 
if any, of a charitable contribution. This part of the Article 
explains that although tax benefits generally were ignored 
prior to the TCJA, the TCJA fundamentally has changed 
the legal landscape by limiting the SALT deduction. This 
change paves the way for tax benefits to be considered as 
relevant external features that may and should be taken 
into account for purposes of determining a contribution 
under longstanding principles of charitable contribution 
law. 
A. Contextualizing the Full Deduction Rule 
Prior law (i.e., pre-TCJA law) supports a proposition 
that has been termed the “full deduction rule” by several 
law professors in a recent article (the FDR Paper).61 Under 
the full deduction rule, tax benefits generally are ignored 
for charitable deduction purposes, in that they neither 
negate donative intent nor constitute a return benefit that 
reduces the amount of the deduction. As discussed below, 
after the TCJA the full deduction rule is best viewed in 
context and does not provide meaningful authority for 
ignoring tax benefits when determining the extent of a 
contribution. 
 
 61. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 642, 654 (stating that the full deduction 
rule is “well-settled law” supported by “decades of precedent”). 
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1. Relevance of the pre-TCJA legal baseline 
The FDR Paper emphasizes an IRS Chief Counsel 
Advice from 2011 (2011 CCA) as “summariz[ing]” “the legal 
authority supporting the full deduction rule.”62 The issue in 
the 2011 CCA was whether a transfer to a charity that 
entitles the taxpayer to a state tax credit should be 
characterized as a charitable contribution or as a payment 
of state tax liability.63 In discussing the issue, the IRS noted 
that donative intent was required for a charitable 
contribution, and recited the general rules on donative 
intent, including the Singer, American Bar Endowment, 
and Hernandez cases.64 The IRS concluded that “[t]he tax 
benefit of a federal or state charitable contribution 
deduction is not regarded as a return benefit that negates 
charitable intent, reducing or eliminating the deduction 
itself.”65 On its face, as the FDR Paper suggests, this 
statement supports a full deduction rule, i.e., that tax 
benefits are ignored for contribution purposes.66 
 
 62. Id. at 644 (discussing I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 201105010 (Feb. 4, 
2011)). For additional discussion, see Peter L. Faber, Comment on Professor 
Stark’s Prompt, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS 9, 9 (2018) (noting that the 
2011 CCA “is not precedential and does not necessarily state the IRS’s official 
position”); Jared Walczak, The Ways of Paradox: What Renders a Contribution 
Deductible?, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS 4, 7 (2018) (noting the limitations 
of the 2011 CCA); Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at 8 
(noting that “reliance on the memo seems misplaced, however. By law, that 
memo may not be cited as precedent, and it has no greater authority than other 
internal IRS memos, including those that express concerns over whether state 
tax credits negate a taxpayer’s charitable intent”). 
 63. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. A main issue was whether a state tax credit should be treated 
differently from a state tax deduction. The IRS made a similar statement in 
CCA 200238041, noting that a state charitable contribution deduction “is not 
viewed as a return benefit that reduces or eliminates a deduction under § 170, 
or vitiates charitable intent.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200238041 (Sept. 
20, 2002); see also FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 645 (discussing CCA 
200238041). 
 66. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 644–45. 
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After the TCJA, however, the IRS’s articulation of the 
full deduction rule should be viewed against the then 
prevailing legal baseline of deductible state taxes. Notably, 
in the 2011 CCA, the IRS said that “[t]here may be unusual 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to 
recharacterize a payment of cash or property that was, in 
form, a charitable contribution as, in substance, a 
satisfaction of tax liability.”67 But, such a recharacterization 
was not called for at the time because  
[g]enerally . . . a state or local tax benefit is treated for federal tax 
purposes as a reduction or potential reduction in tax liability. As 
such, it is reflected in a reduced deduction for the payment of state 
or local tax under [SALT] not as consideration that might 
constitute a quid pro quo, for purposes of [a charitable 
contribution].68 
Thus, the IRS concluded that the state tax benefit was 
not a return benefit for charitable deduction purposes 
because the state benefit comes at a cost in the form of a 
reduced SALT deduction. The IRS noted specifically that 
the “[t]axpayers are not entitled to a [SALT] deduction for 
the amount of the state tax credit used to offset their State 
tax liability.”69 In other words, given the general 
deductibility of state income taxes on federal returns,70 if a 
state offers a reduction in state income tax for charitable 
contributions (whether by credit or deduction), the reduced 
 
 67. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4. At the time of the IRS opinion, it may 
have been hard to foresee an “unusual circumstance” when a substance over 
form analysis would be required. But that was before the TCJA made state 
workaround schemes in the economic self-interest of a taxpayer. See Walczak, 
supra note 62, at 7 (noting that if the state workaround credits “do not 
constitute such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what would”). 
 68. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Prior to the TCJA, there was no express limit on the itemized deduction 
for state and local taxes. That said, as an itemized deduction, the deduction is 
not available to nonitemizers. Also, before the TCJA, the SALT deduction was 
subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions, known as the Pease 
limitation. I.R.C. § 63 (2012). 
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state tax liability means the loss of a SALT deduction in the 
same amount. Thus, in the IRS’s view, it did not make 
sense to regard a state tax credit as a return benefit.71 
To illustrate, assume a taxpayer who is in a 37% federal 
income tax bracket and has state income tax liability.72 Also 
assume that the state allows a 100% income tax credit for 
payments to the X Fund, which is a section 501(c)(3) 
organization. Before the TCJA, for every $1,000 the 
taxpayer pays the state in taxes, the taxpayer gets a $1,000 
SALT deduction, saving the taxpayer $370.73 Thus, the 
after-tax cost of the $1,000 tax payment is $630. By 
contrast, if the taxpayer makes a $1,000 payment to the X 
Fund, the $1,000 reduction in state taxes from the credit 
 
 71. The IRS also says in another ruling (also cited by the FDR Paper 
authors), that it does not make sense to view state tax benefits as the 
“equivalent of a payment to the taxpayer” because the benefit “simply enters 
into the computation of the taxpayer’s state or local tax liability and is reflected 
in the amount of the taxpayer’s § 164 [SALT] deduction.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. 
Adv. Mem. 201147024, n.1 (Nov. 25, 2011). The IRS makes a similar point in 
IRS Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200435001, noting that “if a charitable 
contribution deduction under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code is not 
allowable for federal income tax purposes, it is possible that an equivalent 
deduction may be allowable under I.R.C. § 162 or § 164, as a payment of state 
tax.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200435001 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
 72. The current top marginal rate is 37 percent. Before the TCJA, the top 
marginal rate was 39.6 percent. TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 
2054, 2054–59 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); 
Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-
tax-rates. 
 73. The examples also assume the taxpayer does not owe AMT. Because 
state taxes are not deductible for AMT purposes but charitable contributions 
are, it has been possible to derive a profit from the combined value of state tax 
credits and the federal charitable deduction. This was an arguable misuse of the 
charitable deduction under prior law and has been described as a questionable 
tax shelter. See PUDELSKI & DAVIS, supra note 14, at 3–4 (relaying several 
different tax shelter promotions such as: “If you are a taxpayer stuck in . . . 
AMT, this charitable contribution can make you money!”; “you can make money 
by donating”; “you will end with more money than when you started”). To the 
extent the full deduction rule was used to validate profit-taking via the 
charitable deduction for AMT taxpayers, it was applied beyond the confines of 
the CCA, the legal baseline for which was deductible state taxes. 
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also means a reduced SALT deduction of $1,000. In other 
words, the taxpayer stands to lose the value of the SALT 
deduction ($370) by making the payment to charity. Thus, if 
the taxpayer makes the payment to charity, and it is not 
deductible as a charitable contribution, the after-tax cost to 
the taxpayer is $1,000, meaning that the taxpayer is worse 
off than if the taxpayer had made the payment directly to 
the state. 
Under these circumstances, the IRS viewed the state 
tax credit as a detriment not a benefit. Although the 
taxpayer receives a dollar for dollar return for the 
contribution in terms of reduced tax liability, because of the 
loss of the SALT deduction, the return does not benefit the 
taxpayer apart from the intangible and incidental benefit of 
allocating tax dollars to a particular cause. Thus, rightly or 
wrongly, by applying a full deduction rule and ignoring the 
state tax benefit, the IRS simply allowed the deduction (as 
a charitable contribution) of an otherwise deductible 
expense. 
To take the illustration further, once a charitable 
deduction of the $1,000 payment to the X Fund is allowed, 
the value of the $1,000 deduction to the taxpayer is $370, 
bringing the after-tax cost of the $1,000 outlay back to 
$630. By applying a full deduction rule, instead of paying 
$370 as a SALT deduction, the federal government pays 
$370 as a charitable deduction.74 The state has the same 
spending power ($1,000, through the charity). The federal 
government makes the same contribution ($370). The 
taxpayer’s total outlay in either case is $1,000, the after-tax 
cost of which is $670. Allowing the charitable deduction for 
the state tax benefit does not benefit the taxpayer who is in 
the same position after taxes as if the taxpayer paid the 
state directly. 
 
 74. All the State achieves with the 100% credit is to direct the taxpayer’s 
payment toward a particular cause sanctioned by the State. 
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The same analysis applies to less lucrative state tax 
benefits, whether in the form of a credit or a deduction. For 
example, assume that a state offers either a 10% credit or a 
deduction for contributions to a section 501(c)(3) 
organization. Also assume that the state income tax is a flat 
rate of 10% and again that the taxpayer is in a 37% federal 
income tax bracket. If the taxpayer makes a $1,000 
payment to a 501(c)(3) organization, pursuant to either the 
credit or the deduction, the payment reduces state taxes by 
$100. The reduction in state taxes also means the loss of a 
$100 SALT deduction. As before, even though the value of 
the tax benefit is much less ($100), the tax benefit is still a 
detriment to the taxpayer for federal tax purposes because 
of the related loss of a $100 SALT deduction (a $37 value). 
For the IRS to allow the $100 tax benefit to be deducted as 
a charitable contribution under the full deduction rule 
again is simply to allow the taxpayer to recover what would 
otherwise be a deductible amount. 
Critically, therefore, when the IRS articulated the full 
deduction rule, the context was the pre TCJA legal 
baseline: the federal deductibility of state and local tax 
payments. The full deduction rule was the mechanism for 
allowing the deduction of an otherwise deductible amount. 
Put another way, the full deduction rule was a means of 
implementing the policy of the SALT deduction rather than 
the policy of the charitable deduction. By limiting the SALT 
deduction, however, the TCJA undercuts the reasoning that 
supported the full deduction rule, i.e., the loss of the SALT 
deduction due to the contribution. Thus, the TCJA has 
opened the door for the Treasury Department and the 
courts to characterize state tax benefits as an external 
feature that should be considered in determining whether 
there is a contribution. 
2. Case law cited in support of the full deduction rule 
In addition, the cases the IRS cited in the 2011 CCA in 
support of the full deduction rule do not stand for a bright 
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line rule that receipt of tax benefits are ignored. Instead, 
the cases discuss the role of a tax avoidance motive in 
determining the donative intent of the taxpayer (i.e., the 
relevance of the fact that a taxpayer gives because of the tax 
benefits and not from a pure charitable impulse). The cases 
generally conclude that a tax avoidance motive is not 
controlling. 
For example, in McLennan v. United States, the IRS 
argued that the taxpayers contributed a conservation 
easement solely for the tax benefits and other selfish 
reasons, and therefore the deduction should be disallowed.75 
The court disagreed, finding that, tax benefits aside, the 
taxpayers “believed that the imposition of a conservation 
easement would decrease the value of their property. Their 
decision to donate the easement was, therefore, not an easy 
one.”76 The court also said that the taxpayers “did not 
inquire into the tax consequences of the conveyance until 
after the decision to transfer the scenic easement was 
made” and “were [not] motivated by tax concerns in 
granting the scenic easement.”77 Thus, the court concluded: 
“Any benefit which inured to plaintiff from the conveyance 
was merely incidental to an important, public spirited, 
charitable purpose” and the taxpayers therefore had “the 
requisite donative intent.”78 Setting aside the court’s 
(somewhat questionable) reliance on subjective concerns, 
the case stands for the proposition that when a taxpayer 
has given up something of value, the fact that tax benefits 
are part of a taxpayer’s motive for giving is not controlling. 
Similarly, in Skripak v. Commissioner, the IRS also 
argued that the taxpayers were motivated by tax avoidance 
in making charitable contributions and so should not get a 
 
 75. 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 105 (1991), aff’d, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 76. Id. at 106. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 107. 
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deduction.79 The court, however, said that “a taxpayer’s 
desire to avoid or eliminate taxes by contributing cash or 
property to charities cannot be used as a basis for 
disallowing the deduction for that charitable 
contribution.”80 This statement merely confirms that 
subjective motive is not the test for a contribution. What 
mattered to the court in Skripak was the outcome of the 
taxpayer’s actions, namely that they actually contributed 
property (books) to charity; their reason for doing so was 
not significant.81 The court said, citing Gregory v. Helvering: 
“the determinative question is ‘whether what was done, 
apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute 
intended.’”82 Helping charity by providing books for use in 
charitable programs “is precisely the result intended by [the 
charitable deduction].”83 
3. Summary 
In sum, the full deduction rule, as embodied by the 
IRS’s statement in the 2011 CCA that the receipt of state 
tax benefits “is not regarded as a return benefit that 
negates charitable intent, reducing or eliminating the 
deduction itself” is now of questionable applicability.84 The 
IRS made the statement in reliance on the longstanding 
general rule, now changed, that state tax payments were 
 
 79. See 84 T.C. 285, 314 (1985). 
 80. Id. at 319. 
 81. Id. at 319–20. 
 82. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregory v. Helving, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)). 
 83. Id. at 319–20. That said, the taxpayers in Skripak overvalued the books, 
and although the court found they were entitled to a charitable deduction, the 
amount was reduced to the actual value. Id. at 328–29. In addition to 
McClennan and Skripak, the IRS in the 2011 CCA cited Allen v. Comm’r, 92 
T.C. 1 (1989), aff’d, 925 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1991). See 2011 CCA, supra note 10, 
at 9–10 (Feb. 4, 2011) (applying substance over form analysis to find that 
nothing of value was conveyed to charity and so denying a charitable 
deduction). 
 84. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4. 
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federally deductible. As such, the full deduction rule was 
used to implement the policy of the SALT deduction. 
Further, the cases cited in support of the full deduction rule 
stand for the proposition that subjective reasons (tax 
benefits) for making a transfer are not determinative in 
deciding whether a taxpayer has made a contribution. 
These cases have little to no bearing on the question of 
whether tax benefits are relevant external features of a 
transaction. Accordingly, the full deduction rule does not 
reflect black letter law after the TCJA and should not be 
relied upon to decide whether tax benefits are taken into 
account for contribution purposes. 
B. Denying a Charitable Deduction for State Tax Benefits 
After the TCJA, state and local tax payments over 
$10,000 are not deductible on federal returns.85 The issue is 
whether the nondeductibility of state taxes affects whether 
tax benefits should be taken into account as return benefits 
for purposes of the charitable deduction. As explained 
below, after the TCJA, to allow a charitable deduction for 
state tax benefits would run counter to the longstanding 
principle of charitable contribution law that a deduction 
should be allowed only to the extent a taxpayer makes a 
sacrifice. When the cost of a taxpayer’s contribution is 
reduced by state tax benefits, the reduced cost should be 
reflected in the measure of the contribution for federal tax 
purposes. Further, the failure to take state tax benefits into 
account would convert the charitable deduction from an 
incentive to give into an incentive to profit, which would be 
woefully inconsistent with the purpose of the deduction. 
1. State tax benefits reduce the taxpayer’s cost 
As explained in Part I, the essential measure of a 
 
 85. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2088–87 (2017) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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contribution is the extent of a taxpayer’s sacrifice. The 
standard quid pro quo analysis measures a contribution by 
the amount transferred less the amount received. This 
measure is intended to capture the amount a taxpayer has 
given away, i.e., the taxpayer’s cost. Only this amount is, or 
should be, deductible. Direct and indirect benefits are 
included in the calculation and the benefit does not have to 
be provided by the charity. 
State tax benefits for charitable transfers reduce the 
taxpayer’s cost. Assume that a state provides a 100% state 
income tax credit for a transfer to a charity. A taxpayer 
makes a $1,000 payment to charity. In return, the taxpayer 
may reduce state income taxes by $1,000. The net cost to 
the taxpayer from the transfer is zero. The measure of the 
contribution for federal purposes should reflect the 
taxpayer’s cost and be zero, i.e., no charitable deduction. 
Assume instead that a state with a flat state income tax 
rate of 10% provides a 10% credit, or a deduction, for 
charitable transfers. A taxpayer makes a $1,000 payment to 
charity. Whether the incentive is the credit or the 
deduction, the payment entitles the taxpayer to reduce 
state income taxes by $100. The cost to the taxpayer from 
the transfer is $900. The measure of the contribution for 
federal purposes again should reflect the taxpayer’s cost 
and be $900, i.e., a federal charitable deduction of $900. 
In other words, under both examples, taxpayers should 
not be allowed a federal charitable deduction for state tax 
benefits. The contribution for federal purposes should 
reflect the amount transferred less benefits received.86 As 
 
 86. One could argue that the measure of the contribution should take 
federal tax benefits into account, and further that it is inconsistent to consider 
state but not federal tax benefits as return benefits. The federal charitable 
deduction, however, is best viewed as a giving incentive, the point of which is to 
reduce the taxpayer’s cost. The question is by how much. To the extent the 
taxpayer’s cost is already partially subsidized by state tax benefits, there is, 
after the TCJA, no reason to subsidize the state subsidy with the charitable 
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explained in Section II.A the full deduction rule is not a 
barrier to this result. Further, the result is consistent with 
the longstanding interpretation of a contribution as 
reflecting a taxpayer’s sacrifice or cost. The result also is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to assessing 
a contribution and donative intent based on the external 
features of the transfer. State tax benefits are objectively 
determinable and not based on the taxpayer’s motive. 
Moreover, disallowing a deduction for state tax benefits 
also is consistent with either of the main theories of the 
charitable deduction. Under a subsidy theory, the 
charitable deduction is intended as an incentive to make a 
sacrifice.87 State tax benefits reduce the taxpayer’s sacrifice. 
Allowing their deduction as charity is to incentivize state 
tax benefits, not personal sacrifice. Further, under the less 
widely accepted base-defining theory, a charitable 
deduction is allowed only for amounts not available for the 
taxpayer’s personal consumption.88 State tax benefits 
restore income to the taxpayer for personal use, meaning 
that the taxpayer has an ability to pay federal tax with 
respect to the state tax benefit. In short, under either 
theory, to allow a charitable deduction for state tax benefits 
is to allow a deduction even though the taxpayer has not 
suffered a reduction in wealth.89 
 
deduction. To reduce the amount of the federal subsidy by taking into account 
the value of federal tax benefits, however, would be an indirect way of reducing 
the cost of the federal subsidy that runs counter to the traditional measure of 
the contribution amount and undoubtedly would require legislation. 
 87. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable 
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax 
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001) (noting that the 
conventional wisdom is that charitable tax benefits subsidize the social benefits 
charities provide). 
 88. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309, 344–76 (1972). For a discussion of the base-defining and 
subsidy theories and implications for tax reform, see Roger Colinvaux, Rationale 
and Changing the Charitable Deduction, 138 TAX NOTES 1453 (2013). 
 89. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts” – The 
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2. An incentive to profit 
In addition, to allow a taxpayer a charitable deduction 
for state tax benefits potentially is to convert the charitable 
deduction from an incentive to give into an incentive to 
profit. Doing so would be contrary to the purpose of the 
charitable deduction and is not required by the TCJA. 
For example, assume a taxpayer that has $40,000 of 
now nondeductible state tax liability and who is in a 37% 
federal income tax bracket.90 The state allows a state 
income tax reduction for payments to Fund X. If the 
taxpayer pays $40,000 to the state as income taxes the 
after-tax cost to the taxpayer is $40,000. But, if payments to 
Fund X are federally deductible as charitable contributions, 
then depending on the level of the state tax benefit it may 
be in the taxpayer’s economic interest to make a 
contribution to Fund X. 
First, assume that a state provides a 100% income tax 
credit for contributions to Fund X. The taxpayer pays 
$40,000 to Fund X, which (for the sake of argument) is 
deductible as a federal charitable contribution. In return, 
the taxpayer gets a $40,000 reduction in state taxes plus a 
federal charitable deduction worth $14,800 ($40,000 times 
37%). By reason of the payment to Fund X, the taxpayer 
saves $14,800—a net benefit. Thus, the taxpayer will profit 
by making the outlay to Fund X instead of paying the state 
directly. In other words, if a charitable deduction for the 
state tax benefit is allowed, the federal government 
finances a windfall to the taxpayer who has made no 
 
Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a 
Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 441, 521 (2003) (noting that “charitable deductions are allowed 
only to the extent that the donor’s wealth is reduced”). 
 90. The taxpayer may have additional state tax liability that is deductible. 
For example, given the assumption of $40,000 of nondeductible state tax 
liability, the likely state tax obligation is $50,000 given that $10,000 of SALT is 
deductible, assuming that the taxpayer otherwise has sufficient additional 
itemized expenses to forego the standard deduction. 
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sacrifice and who in fact now profits from the transaction. 
Through the charitable deduction, the taxpayer finances a 
$40,000 liability by paying only $25,200. The $14,800 
savings is kept by the taxpayer and deducted. 
If the state tax benefit is less than a 100% credit, a 
taxpayer may still be able to profit from a charitable 
contribution. To take one example, assume the state 
provides an 80% income tax credit for contributions to Fund 
Y and again the taxpayer has a nondeductible state tax 
obligation of $40,000. The taxpayer makes a $40,000 
contribution to Fund Y and gets a $32,000 reduction in 
state tax liability in return, thereby reducing (direct) state 
income tax payments to $8,000.91 If the $40,000 is 
deductible as a charitable contribution on the taxpayer’s 
federal return, the taxpayer saves $14,800 in taxes. This 
savings can be used to pay the remaining $8,000 of state 
tax liability, with another $6,800 left over for the taxpayer 
to keep. Thus, in order to fund a tax obligation of $40,000, 
the taxpayer has an outlay of $48,000 ($40,000 transfer to 
Fund Y and $8,000 in direct tax payments), the after-tax 
cost of which is $33,200. 
In this example, therefore, the $40,000 in state tax 
liability can cost the taxpayer $40,000 if made directly to 
the state or $33,200 if made to Fund Y. In other words, 
reducing the amount of the state credit from 100% to 80% 
means a lower economic benefit to the taxpayer, $6,800 
instead of $14,800, but in either case, the taxpayer profits 
from the transaction. This is little more than using the 
charitable deduction as a tax shelter, not as a means to 
promote sacrifice. 
As explained in a recent paper by the Institute on 
Taxation & Economic Policy some taxpayers already appear 
 
 91. The $8,000 tax payment may be deductible under SALT if the taxpayer 
had not already used the $10,000 SALT deduction (and has sufficient other 
itemized expenses). 
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to be taking advantage of this sort of profit taking.92 The 
State of Alabama offers a 100% income tax credit for certain 
contributions.93 Prior to the TCJA, the take up rate with 
respect to the credit was low, suggesting that taxpayers had 
little interest in making these contributions in lieu of 
payments to the State’s general treasury fund (which could 
be used for any purpose of the State).94 However, after the 
TCJA’s SALT limitation made state tax payments more 
expensive, taxpayers have an economic incentive to shift 
payments from the State’s general fund to the State 
sanctioned charity, and the Alabama 100% credit program 
quickly reached its limit.95 The timing of the sudden 
popularity of the credit program suggests taxpayers 
recognized the ability to profit from the charitable 
deduction. 
3. Lack of supportive congressional intent 
For the Treasury Department or the courts to construe 
the charitable deduction to allow a deduction for state tax 
benefits, and to incentivize profitable transactions in this 
manner, would run counter to the purpose of the deduction 
without any supportive congressional intent. In the words 
of the Supreme Court in Hernandez, the courts should not 
“expand the charitable contribution deduction . . . beyond 
what Congress has provided;”96 an outcome the court was 
“loath to effect . . . in the absence of supportive 
 
 92. CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, SALT/CHARITABLE 
WORKAROUND CREDITS REQUIRE A BROAD FIX, NOT A NARROW ONE: NARROW 
FEDERAL ACTION WOULD BE UNFAIR, ARBITRARY, AND INEFFECTIVE 2 (2018), 
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/charitableworkaround_0518.pdf. 
 93. Id. at 9–10. 
 94. Id. at 10–11 (noting that “It was not until the donations actually become 
profitable for a larger group of taxpayers—because of the SALT cap—that the 
state began easily distributing its full credit allotment.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 693 (1989). 
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congressional intent.”97 
In the TCJA, Congress expressly eliminated the 
deductibility of state and local tax payments above 
$10,000.98 At a minimum, this illustrates Congress’s intent 
to deny a deduction for state tax payments. As explained in 
Section II.A, a corollary of the change is to moot the full 
deduction rule, which allowed a deduction for an otherwise 
deductible amount. Thus, Congress changed the policy of 
the SALT deduction, but left alone the general principle 
that a charitable contribution reflects taxpayer sacrifice. 
There is no supportive congressional intent in the TCJA to 
undermine this basic principle of charitable contribution 
law.99 
Further, as a general matter, there is historical 
precedent that Congress does not intend for tax benefits 
associated with the charitable deduction to generate 
taxpayer profit.100 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the 
combination of a fair market value-based charitable 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2088–87 (2017) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 99. Others have argued that recharacterizing tax payments as charitable 
contributions is to take a form over substance approach contrary to 
congressional intent. See Faber supra note 62, at 11 (citing substance over form 
as the basis for disallowing the charitable deduction); Walczak, supra note 62, 
at 6 (same). Professor Amandeep Grewal provides an in depth discussion of a 
substance over form approach as compared to alternatives in Ineffective SALT 
Substitute, supra note 11 (recommending a substance over form approach). As a 
general matter, a substance over form approach would apply only to state 
credits not deductions, and does not address the broader issue of the 
appropriate measurement of a contribution for federal tax purposes after the 
TCJA. 
 100. Even if it was possible under prior law for taxpayers, especially AMT 
taxpayers, to profit from the charitable deduction, it does not follow that it was 
right or correct as a matter of law. By (potentially) opening the floodgates to 
charitable tax shelters the TCJA has called attention to a problem that already 
existed in the periphery. Further, by undermining the full deduction rule, the 
TCJA gives the Treasury Department and the courts the opportunity to protect 
the integrity of the charitable deduction. 
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deduction for appreciated property and high marginal 
ordinary income tax rates made it possible for a taxpayer to 
be better off donating rather than selling property. This 
result was anathema to Congress. In changing the law to 
reduce the amount allowed as a deduction, the Senate 
Finance Committee explained that the charitable deduction 
was not: 
intended to provide greater—or even nearly as great—tax benefits 
in the case of gifts of property than would be realized if the 
property were sold and the proceeds were retained by the 
taxpayer. In cases where the tax savings is so large, it is not clear 
how much charitable motivation actually remains. It appears that 
the Government, in fact, is almost the sole contributor to the 
charity.101 
This excerpt shows that the Committee viewed the 
charitable deduction as an incentive to encourage acts of 
generosity. If tax benefits become too lucrative, they cloud 
donative intent, and Congress concluded that there should 
be no deduction even though the charity still received 
valuable property.102 
 
 101. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 80–81 (1969). For additional discussion of the 
change, see Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken 
System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263 (2013). Note that the ability of 
taxpayers to deduct untaxed appreciation is also a windfall to donors, widely 
viewed as a mistake the Treasury Department made in writing regulations 
early in the 20th century. Id. at 268. The Treasury Department should not 
make a similar mistake now. 
 102. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 80–81. The legislation reduced the amount allowed 
as a deduction from fair market value to the donor’s cost basis (i.e., a recovery of 
the amount paid for the property). Id. One could argue that because this result 
required legislation, legislation should also be required today. However, the 
argument of this Article is that the basis for ignoring state tax benefits under 
prior law—the full deduction rule—was the general deductibility of state and 
local taxes. With the SALT limitation of the TCJA mooting the full deduction 
rule, regular charitable contribution principles come into play making 
additional legislation unnecessary. Of course Congress could amend the law 
specifically to allow the deduction of state and local tax benefits, but Congress 
has not. Furthermore, the reason legislation was required in 1969 was because 
the external features of a donation of property would not take into account the 
tax savings of not paying tax on capital gain. Whether the taxpayer would have 
otherwise sold the property and triggered the capital gains tax is a subjective 
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Thus, historically, Congress has not intended for the 
charitable deduction to become a windfall for the taxpayer. 
Construing the meaning of contribution to allow a 
deduction for amounts not spent, absent express 
congressional intent, is inconsistent with this basic goal and 
would expand the deduction beyond its historic confines as 
a giving incentive into a profitable tax shelter. The measure 
of a contribution is a taxpayer’s sacrifice; state tax benefits 
received for a charitable transfer should be taken into 
account. 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONCERNS 
The implications of the implicit repeal of the full 
deduction rule and measuring a contribution by the extent 
of a taxpayer’s sacrifice are several. Most obvious is that 
state efforts to avoid the cap on the SALT deduction by 
setting up charitable funds for taxpayers to make transfers 
in exchange for state tax benefits would be ineffective. More 
broadly affected though, would be the deductibility of other 
payments to section 501(c)(3) organizations that trigger 
state tax benefits and previously have been deductible.103 
There also would be administrative issues associated with 
denying a charitable deduction for state tax benefits. 
A. Nondeductibility of Previously Deductible Expenses 
As argued in this Article, the historic approach to 
defining a contribution as the measure of a taxpayer’s 
sacrifice strongly suggests that no charitable deduction is 
allowed for state tax benefits. This analysis applies equally 
to existing state credits and deductions as to credits 
designed to avoid the SALT limit. Thus, whereas before the 
 
question and not an inherent part of the transfer. 
 103. The FDR Paper provides a listing of many such state programs. FDR 
Paper, supra note 9, at App’x. A. See also DAVIS, supra note 92, at 11–15 
(providing an overview of different state credit programs). 
812 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
TCJA, a taxpayer could deduct as charity the value of a 
100% tax credit; after the TCJA no deduction for the state 
tax benefit should be allowed. 
Further, as explained below, although denying a 
charitable deduction for amounts that previously were 
deductible as charity may seem like a dramatic legal 
change, doing so in fact reflects the status quo of pre-TCJA 
law, in that under prior law, given the loss of a SALT 
deduction, a charitable deduction for state tax benefits was 
not a benefit to the taxpayer. Accordingly, to deny a 
charitable deduction for state tax benefits after the TCJA is 
a change more of form than substance. 
To illustrate, consider again a state that offers a 100% 
income tax credit for payments to a state preferred 
charity.104 Before the TCJA, as a matter of federal law it 
made no difference to a taxpayer whether the taxpayer 
made a payment to the charity or directly to the state. A 
full deduction for the payment was allowed in either case, 
whether under the SALT deduction or the full deduction 
rule. 
For example, if a taxpayer in the 37% federal income 
tax bracket made a $1,000 payment, the federal subsidy 
would be $370 either as a SALT deduction or as a 
charitable deduction. The charitable deduction for the value 
of the state tax benefit provided no added benefit. The same 
was true for less valuable state tax credits or a state 
charitable deduction. The federal charitable deduction for 
the value of the state tax benefit was an offset to the loss of 
the SALT deduction. 
After the TCJA, however, if the full deduction rule 
continues to be applied, the charitable deduction would now 
be a gain to the taxpayer. For instance, in the example 
 
 104. The Supreme Court discussed an Establishment Clause challenge to one 
such program in Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011). 
See also FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 651–52. 
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above, if the taxpayer makes the $1,000 payment to the 
state, the federal subsidy is zero (assuming the SALT cap is 
otherwise met). If the taxpayer makes the payment to the 
state preferred charity, the federal subsidy is $370, all of 
which represents a profit to the taxpayer. In other words, 
before the TCJA, federal tax law was neutral between the 
two payments. Continued deductibility as charity of the 
state tax benefits would undermine this neutrality and spur 
taxpayers to make contributions to the state preferred 
charity, and at a potentially high cost to the federal 
treasury. 
The authors of the FDR Paper cite federalism concerns 
as a reason to allow continued deductibility of state tax 
benefits. According to the FDR Paper, the full deduction 
rule “is properly neutral” toward state initiatives.105 
However, as discussed above, this was true prior to the 
TCJA, when the full deduction rule allowed a charitable 
deduction in order to foster symmetry with the SALT 
deduction. After the TCJA, a federally neutral approach is 
to deny the charitable deduction for state tax benefits; to do 
otherwise is to directly subsidize the provision of state tax 
benefits, which is not neutral. In addition, states would 
remain free to offer incentives that reduce the cost of the 
transaction and a federal deduction would still be available 
with respect to the payment unless the state fully 
reimbursed the taxpayer’s cost. 
In short, the critical point is that not to allow a 
charitable deduction for state tax benefits after the TCJA is 
in fact to remain faithful to the status quo prior to the 
TCJA. The status quo was that taxpayers derived no benefit 
from the charitable deduction.106 To apply the full deduction 
rule after the TCJA would be to provide a new benefit, to 
 
 105. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 654. 
 106. As discussed, supra notes 73 and 100, AMT taxpayers did derive a 
benefit. 
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define charity in a new way that does not require sacrifice, 
and to allow a deduction for kept amounts. 
B. Administrative Issues 
Disallowing a charitable deduction for state tax benefits 
will have administrative implications. A detailed discussion 
of administrative issues is beyond the scope of this 
Article.107 As a general matter, however, because taxpayers 
would have to reduce the amount claimed as a federal 
charitable deduction by the value of any state tax benefits 
received, the amount of the state tax benefit for charitable 
transfers would have to be determined as a routine part of 
federal tax preparation. 
If the state tax benefit is a credit, in general, the value 
of the tax benefit is the amount paid times a set percentage. 
As the FDR Paper authors detail, charitable tax credits 
may have a number of complicating features, including 
caps, filing status limits, varying credit percentages, 
priority rules, and carryforwards.108 These features attest 
to the complexity of the particular state credit at issue, but 
nonetheless, the amount, even if complex to calculate, must 
be determined by the taxpayer in any event and so can be 
accounted for on the federal return. 
If the state tax benefit takes the form of a deduction, 
the value of the tax benefit depends on the state marginal 
 
 107. The authors of the FDR Paper wrote a second paper that focused on 
administrative problems with limiting the full deduction rule. Caveat IRS, 
supra note 46. Many of the problems they identify relate to possible changes to 
the full deduction rule that are not suggested in this Article. For example, they 
consider the implications of applying the full deduction rule to some charities 
but not others and the potential difficulties of measuring the contribution when 
both federal and state tax benefits are taken into account. Id. at 550–556. 
Neither approach is suggested here, thus the authors’ concerns about 
arbitrariness and circularity, which make up the bulk of the paper, are of less 
relevance. The FDR Paper also argues that eliminating the full deduction rule 
would present “administrative difficulties.” FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 654. 
 108. Caveat IRS, supra note 46, at 552. 
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rate of the taxpayer. In states with one income tax rate, the 
value of the benefit is straightforward (the amount paid 
times the rate). In states where the value of the benefit 
depends upon knowing the marginal rate of the taxpayer, 
the calculation is more complex, yet still is a calculation 
already required for purposes of the state return. The 
challenge, as with a credit, is accounting for the value of the 
state tax benefit on the federal return. 
The principal administrative challenges thus likely 
relate to timing issues. These would arise if the taxpayer 
files the federal return before the state return. In such 
cases, the taxpayer would have to determine for the federal 
return the value of state tax benefits prior to filing the state 
return. This is made more complex for states that base 
state taxable income on federal taxable income, which as 
the FDR Paper authors point out, “depends on the amount 
of the federal deduction allowed.”109 In addition, if a state 
denies the claimed benefit, or the taxpayer subsequently 
does not claim the state tax benefit, the taxpayer in theory 
should be allowed to increase the claimed amount of the 
federal charitable deduction through an amended return. 
One possible solution to these concerns, proffered by the 
FDR Paper authors, would be to delay the accounting for 
state tax benefits to the year following the contribution 
year.110 In the year of contribution, the taxpayer would take 
a federal charitable deduction that included the value of the 
state tax benefit. The following year, the taxpayer would 
include as income the value of the state tax benefit. This is 
a similar approach to accounting for state tax refunds (and 
 
 109. Id. at 551. Professor Grewal notes that “only 6 states use federal taxable 
income as the starting point to compute state taxable income;” Most states use 
adjusted gross income. Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at 
25, n.124. Further, as Grewal suggests, to the extent circularity problems arise, 
“that would reflect a problem appropriately addressed by changing the state tax 
system, not by twisting Section 170.” Id., n.123. 
 110. Caveat IRS, supra note 46, at 553. 
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other state payments) on federal returns.111 This is not to 
suggest that such an approach is necessarily the best or 
would address all issues, but rather to note that 
administrative solutions could and would be developed.112 
In short, although denying a federal charitable 
deduction for the value of state tax benefits would introduce 
additional complexity to tax administration, complexity is a 
mainstay of the federal tax system and often necessary as a 
matter of law and to implement sound policy. The policy 
here is to maintain the charitable deduction as an incentive 
to give not to profit. To subsidize amounts not spent is not 
the purpose of the charitable deduction, nor is such an 
expansion of the charitable deduction legally required by 
the TCJA. Potential administrative concerns should not be 
decisive in construing the meaning of a contribution for 
federal tax purposes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, state tax benefits 
could be deducted as charitable contributions pursuant to a 
full deduction rule. The IRS conceived the full deduction 
rule against a legal baseline of deductible state tax 
payments. The essence of the rule was to allow as a 
charitable contribution the deduction of an otherwise 
deductible expense. As such, the full deduction rule was an 
instrument of the SALT deduction not the charitable 
deduction and did not make taxpayers better off. 
The TCJA fundamentally changed the law by 
substantially limiting the deductibility of state and local tax 
payments. One corollary of the change is to undermine the 
 
 111. See IRS Form 1099-G: Certain Government Payments. 
 112. As a general matter, as Professor Grewal argues, “[i]ntertwined tax 
systems no doubt present compliance questions, but we now have years of 
principles and practices to help answer them.” Grewal, Ineffective SALT 
Substitute, supra note 11, at 26. 
2018] FAILED CHARITY 817 
 
full deduction rule, leaving open the question of how to 
account for state tax benefits for purposes of the charitable 
deduction. 
Under established principles, a charitable contribution 
is measured by the taxpayer’s sacrifice. If the cost of a 
taxpayer’s payment to charity is reduced by state tax 
benefits, the taxpayer’s sacrifice is reduced. Accordingly, a 
contribution for federal tax purposes should take into 
account the value of state tax benefits received. 
Continued application of the full deduction rule is not 
warranted and would convert the charitable deduction from 
an incentive to give into an incentive to profit. Allowing a 
deduction for state tax benefits would be to allow taxpayers 
to deduct amounts not spent and that are available for the 
taxpayer’s use. This result is anathema to the fundamental 
idea of an incentive for giving and for selfless behavior. The 
result applies equally to credits devised as workarounds to 
the SALT deduction as to other state credits and 
deductions. States remain free to provide tax benefits for 
transfers to charity, but the value of the tax benefits 
received should not be considered part of the contribution 
for federal tax purposes. 
The issue going forward for the Treasury Department 
and the courts is stark: to allow the charitable deduction to 
become a tax shelter, or to preserve the historic nature of 
the deduction as an incentive for selfless behavior. 
